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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 950230-CA
Priority No. 2

DALE RYAN McGRATH,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The

fourth

amendment

to

the

federal

constitution

provides:
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers,
and
effects,
against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of
warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated;
and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

CORRECTION OF ERRATA.

At p.7 n.l, the State incorrectly states that Mr. Ricks
pled guilty to one count of robbery.

Mr. Ricks actually pled

guilty to one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony.
See Addendum B in appellant's opening brief.
At

p. 23,

the

State

asserts

that

Mr.

Ricks

interrogated until some 20 to 30 hours after his arrest.
cited, R. 24 8, involves the trial court

was

not

The page

saying "Well, there was--

there was a confession some 20, 30 hours later."

The trial court

is not a witness, and was doubtless not present at Mr. Ricks'
interrogation.

In fact, Mr. Ricks was interrogated no later than

8 hours after his arrest.

R. 150

(Mr. Ricks testifies he was

interviewed the next day); see also addendum A (waiver of rights
form signed 3/22/93 at 1:09 P.M.; p. 20 of unofficial preliminary
hearing transcript where Officer Glover indicates his recollection
that he interrogated Mr. Ricks the morning after his arrest; police
report indicating that Officers Glover and Garner spoke with Mr.
Ricks on 3/22/93 and he signed a waiver at that time). 1

POINT II. THE STATE HAS MISREPRESENTED THE HOLDING
IN BROWN V. ILLINOIS.
(Responding to State's brief at p. 15 and 22 n.8)
The State asserts that in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), the Supreme Court "did
not hold that the taint of the illegal arrest had not been purged,
merely that the Illinois courts 'were in error in assuming that the

x

These documents are not part of the record on appeal. Given
the State's action in making this an issue, appellant would request
that the court take judicial notice of these official police
documents for the limited purposes set forth here.
2

Miranda

warnings, by themselves, . . . always purge the taint of an

illegal

Id.

arrest.'

at

605."

misrepresents the holding in Brown.

This

assertion

completely

Elsewhere in the opinion the

court states:
Although
the
Illinois
courts
failed
to
undertake the inquiry mandated by Wong Sun to evaluate
the circumstances of this case in the light of the policy
served by the exclusionary rule, the trial resulted in a
record of amply sufficient detail and depth from which
the determination may be made. We therefore decline the
suggestion of the United States, as amicus curiae, see
Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102, 90 S.Ct. 291, 24
L.Ed.2d 299 (1969), to remand the case for further

factual findings. We conclude that the State failed
sustain
the burden of showing that
the evidence
question
was admissible
under Wong Sun.

to
in

Brown, 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. at 2262, 45 L.Ed.2d at 427-8
(emphasis added).

The Supreme Court squarely held that under the

facts presented in Brown, attenuation could not be shown.
similarly

egregious

facts

here,

attenuation

is

Under

likewise

not

present.

POINT III. MR. RICKS' TESTIMONY WAS UNATTENUATED
FROM THE ILLEGAL TRAFFIC STOP.
(Responding to State's brief at Point One, pp. 1126)
A.

CASES CITED BY THE STATE ON THE ISSUE OF
FREE WILL ARE DISTINGUISHABLE IN THAT
THEY DO NOT CONCERN "FOUND" WITNESSES, AS
HERE.

Cases relied on by the State are distinguishable.
United States v. Leonardi, 623 F.2d 746, 752-3

In

(2nd Cir. 1980),

cited in State's brief at 18, appellant sought to suppress the
testimony of unindicted co-conspirator Samuel Ax. Mr. Ax's drivers
3

license and social security card were found during an illegal
search of a motel room.

Unlike the present case, the police were

already aware of Ax and his potential complicity:
First, Ax's existence, identity and potential
value as a witness were established prior to the seizure
of Berland's tackle box. Leonardi had already inculpated
Ax by name and description, and the discovery of Ax's
driver's license among the effects of his accomplice did
little more than corroborate that information.
The
license was in no way used to locate or apprehend Ax; in
short, he was not a "found" witness whose existence
became known to the authorities only as a consequence of
the illicit search. Cf. United States v. Scios, 590 F.2d
956 (D.C.Cir.1978).
Second, the evidence so obtained did not, in
itself, implicate Ax in any criminal wrongdoing, much
less armed bank robbery. Indeed, the driver's license
and social security card were meaningless in the absence
of other evidence except to suggest association between
Berland and Ax.
Leonardi, 623 F.2d at 652. Here, police were unaware of Mr. Ricks'
identity and complicity until he was "found" as part of the illegal
traffic

stop.

The

bulk

of

Leonardi

is

not

on

point.

Interestingly, some language in Leonardi bears directly on the
present case:
[T] o hold that Ax's later decision to enter a plea
arrangement which called for his testimony as a
government witness was separable from his initial
confession and represented a distinct act of volition is
somewhat unrealistic and artificial.
623 F.2d at 753.

So here, Mr. Ricks' decision to plead guilty is

inseparable from his original confession, obtained through direct
exploitation of the illegal traffic stop.

To the limited extent

Leonardi is applicable to this case, it supports Mr. McGrath's
position.

4

United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1980) ,
also involved a witness whose identity was discovered
other, legal means.

through

An "M. D. Holt" had been the recipient of one

or more telephone calls from Brookins1 tnotel room, and the police
obtained an address and referred the matter to Nashville police who
followed up on the lead.
illegal

interrogation,

614 F.2d at 104 0.
Brookins

prosecution witness Carlton Holt.

revealed

At a subsequent
the

identity

of

The trial court found that

routine investigation would inevitably lead to the discovery of
Carlton Holt.

614 F.2d at 1048-9. Here, police had no independent

leads that would result in the discovery of Mr. Ricks, a "found"
witness•
United States v. Stevens, 612 f. 2d 1226 (10th Cir. 1979),
cert, denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980), also involved a witness who was
not a "found" witness:
Ruling upon a pretrial motion to exclude Deal's
proposed testimony against Stevens, the court held it was
admissible
on the ground that Deal's identity and his illegal
narcotics dealings were known to law enforcement
officers prior to the illegal wiretaps and further,
and of even greater significance, Deal's statement
to law enforcement officers and his decision to
plead
guilty
and
to
testify
against
his
co-defendants were wholly independent of the
illegal wiretaps.
Steven!./ 612 F.2& at 1223.

¥or the sBrtfte reasons as the above

cases, Stevens does not assist the inquiry here.
In United States v. Hoffman, 385 F.2d

501

(7th Cir.

1967), the police were also aware of the existence of (though not
the identity of) a complained of witness5

The court did find that

this witness's decision to plead guilty purged his testimony of any
taint, and there was no exploitation of the illegal arrest.
Mr. Ricks was a "found" witness.

Here,

Absent the illegal traffic stop,

the police never would have located him and obtained the benefit of
his testimony.
The State relies on a single sentence in a footnote of
People v. Steeg, 258 Cal. Rptr. 86, 91 n.2 (Cal. App. 1989) (where,
as here, an accomplice on advice of counsel elects to accept a plea
bargain and testify against his former codefendants, that testimony
is not subject to exclusion if it is later determined that the
accomplice was arrested or detained illegally).

The Steeg opinion

fails to offer much in the way of facts or analysis.

The opinion

in the case of codefendant Williams, People v. Williams, 756 P.2d
221 (Cal. 1988) is far more helpful.2 The California Supreme Court
found:
defendant failed to make a prima facie case that the
evidence was tainted by the unlawful police entry into
room 28. We seriously doubt he even succeeded in making
the requisite showing that but for the primary illegality
the evidence would not have been obtained. Specifically,
he introduced scant evidence to show that in the absence
of the unlawful entry the police would not have lawfully
seized Finckel; indeed, the officers had Finckel's
description, were at his door, and had information
sufficient to warrant at least an investigative stop.
Moreover, defendant presented little if any evidence to
demonstrate that without the unlawful entry Finckel would
not have talked to the police or agreed to testify for
the prosecution; on the contrary, from the very beginning
Finckel voluntarily cooperated with the authorities . . .

2

Both Steeg and Williams joined in a single motion to
suppress. 258 Cal. Rptr. at 91 ("Because Steeg joined in Williams'
motion, the facts and procedural background in the two cases are
identical.") .
6

People v. Williams, 756 P.2d at 240-1.
witness, as in the case at bar.
that

there was no

Finckel was not a "found"

The California Supreme Court found

taint; the court

of

appeals

discussion

of

attenuation seems most misplaced, in light of the absence of any
taint.

Steeg does not materially assist the State.
State v. Kent, 391 So.2d 429 (La. 1980) is the only case

that legitimately supports the State!s position.

However, Kent

rests on a violation of a Louisiana precedent which holds "that the
confession of a juvenile is absolutely inadmissible unless the
prosecution

shows

that

the

juvenile

engaged

in

a

meaningful

consultation with an attorney or an informed parent, guardian, or
other interested adult before waiving constitutional rights."
So.2d at 431.
evidence

The court failed to address whether derivative

discovered

violation

is

391

under

suppressible

attenuation analysis.

such
at

a non-constitutional

all, and proceeded

to

dimension
apply

an

Cases relied on by appellant are better

reasoned, do not rest on a quirk of Louisiana law, and compel
suppression here.
People v. McGrath, 385 N.E.2d 541 (N.Y. 1978), is not
remotely similar to the instant case.

McGrath, after receiving a

grant of transactional immunity, was held in criminal contempt for
testifying with answers that were "evasive, equivocal and patently
false, such that they amounted to no answers at all."

385 N.E.2d

at 545. The questions were premised on information gleaned from an
illegal

wiretap.

The

court

held

that

McGrath's

contumacious

testimony was a sufficient act of free will to purge any taint
7

flowing

from

appearances

the

before

illegal

wiretaps.

Although

respondents'

the Grand Jury must be viewed

as

causally

related to the illegal wiretaps, their voluntary and deliberate
acts in choosing to testify falsely and evasively before that body
furnished vitally independent links in the chain of causation."
385 N.E.2d at 549.

The instant case bears no similarity at all to

McGrath, save perhaps a shared surname.
The opinion in People v. Burnie, 624 N.Y.S.2d 463 (App.
Div.

1995) , all 207 words of

it, is so devoid of

meaningful

reasoning as to be useless.
The State appears to be making the argument that the
intervening decision of a witness to plead guilty acts as a per
intervening circumstance.

This is precisely the type of argument

rejected by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois
contention

that Miranda

circumstance).

se

warnings act as a per

Each case must be decided

on

se

(rejecting
intervening

its own facts.

Staring down the barrel of two five to life sentences, Mr. Ricks
cannot be said to have acted of his own free will.

B.

POLICE USED THE FRUITS OF THE
STOP IN QUESTIONING MR. RICKS.

ILLEGAL

The State dances delicately around the issue of use of
actual physical evidence in questioning Ricks by stating that it is
unaware of any record
in questioning.

cites

indicating that such evidence was used

As Officer Glover's police report at p. 2, see

8

addendum A, makes clear, Mr. Ricks was confronted with a two dollar
bill found in his possession.3
The

State

rejects

out

of

hand

the

contention

that

knowledge obtained in the course of police illegality is a fruit of
that

illegality.

According

to

the

State, unless

the

police

actually pull out the robbery proceeds and confront Mr. Ricks with
them, the police have not used evidence during the questioning.
This is nonsense.

The State has lost sight of the forest for the

trees.
The
statements
traffic

were

stop.

directly.

inquiry

we

obtained
Certainly,

Likewise,

the

are

making

through

is

whether

exploitation

robbery

proceeds

information

that

of

may
Mr.

possession of robbery proceeds may be exploited.

Mr.
the
be

Ricks'
illegal

exploited

Ricks

was

in

The police need

not say anything; being caught red handed is sufficient to exert
considerable pressure.

The child with his hand in the cookie jar

does not need to have the cookie jar expressly pointed out and
referred to in order to understand that he's in serious trouble.
Here, the interrogation of Mr. McGrath was focused and
directed by what was obtained during the traffic stop:
Ricks' identity; and (2) robbery proceeds.
3

(1) Mr.

This evidence was used

As in many cases, the record here is not perfect. Both sides
could and should have offered additional evidence.
Though
technically evidence concerning the two dollar bill is not before
the court, the court should nevertheless consider its obligation to
see that justice is done. As strenuously as the State argues that
it should not be penalized for the blunders of the constable,
counsel would argue that defendants should not be penalized for the
blunders of their counsel. The true facts here, despite absence of
record cites, are that evidence was used in questioning Mr. Ricks.
9

implicitly

but

directly.

This

factor

weighs

in

favor

of

suppression.

C.

THE POLICE WERE LOOKING FOR EVIDENCE.

The State asserts that this is not a case "where the
police 'embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that
something might turn up 1 ."
weight.

Officer

Dwyer

This contention

testified

that

he

falls of
was

its own

interested

in

appellant as a possible aggravated robbery suspect, and stopped the
car to pursue that hunch.

R. 203, 207-8, 210, 212.

The stop of appellant's vehicle by activation of the
police cruiser's overhead lights can only be described as flagrant.
While not committed in bad faith, the action was nevertheless
deliberate

and

intentional.

We

are not

dealing

oversight like failing to give complete Miranda

with

a mere

warnings.

Finally, there is nothing "laudable" about an illegal
traffic

stop.

True, we

want

police

to

develop

hunches

and

investigate based on them, but they must do so within the confines
of the law.

This factor favors suppression.

D.

TEMPORAL PROXIMITY FAVORS SUPPRESSION.

As set forth in Point I, supra at p. 2, the State has
incorrectly asserted that Mr. Ricks was not interrogated until some
20 to 3 0 hours after his arrest, when in fact he was interrogated
approximately 8 hours thereafter.

10

Appellant fully addressed the remaining aspects of this
issue in his opening brief at Point I.B.3 (pp.19-20) and Point III
(pp. 22-5) .

E.

CASES CITED BY APPELLANT ARE ON POINT.

At p. 24 n.10, the State does a cursory job of attempting
to distinguish the cases principally relied on by appellant.

These

cases are on point, and mandate suppression here.
The State seeks to distinguish United States v. Cruz, 581
F.2d

535

suspects

(5th Cir. 1978)
there

were

(en banc),

questioned

at

by pointing out that the
the

scene

of

the

arrest.

Respectfully, this is a distinction without a difference.

The

eight hour delay prior to questioning did not make Mr. Ricks'
interrogation any less the product of the illegal traffic stop.4
Cruz is on all fours.
The State seeks to distinguish United States v. Scios,
590 F.2d 956

(D.C. Cir. 1978)

(en banc),

on the basis that the

witness there was threatened with contempt.

Here, Mr. Ricks was

facing two first degree felonies with prison terms of five years to
life each.

Mr. Ricks' decision to testify was even more coerced

than the witness in Scios.

This case is on all fours.

The State's criticism of State v. Bravo. 762 P.2d 1318
(Ariz. 1988), has a grain of truth in that the court does not

4

It should be noted that incarceration frequently makes
tongues looser -- after a period of being locked up, detainees are
more likely to try anything to get out, including full and open
confessions.
11

address whether suppression of the fruits of a Miranda
as distinguished
suppressible.5

violation,

from a constitutional violation, are properly

The remainder of the Bravo court's reasoning is

sound, however, and compels suppression here.

The Bravo court did

not adopt a "but-for" test; instead, the court applied a complete
and

proper

attenuation

analysis

and

found

that

there

was

insufficient attenuation to allow the testimony to be admitted.
The cases relied on by appellant are all on point and
compel suppression here.

POINT IV. MR. RICKS1 TESTIMONY IS NOT ADMISSIBLE
UNDER THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE.
(Responding to State's brief at Point Two, pp. 2729)
A.

THE STATE'S INEVITABLE DISCOVERY THEORY
IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

The State asserts that, "Without any misconduct, Sergeant
Dwyer's suspicions would have caused him to follow defendant's
truck, note
check."

its license plate number, and request

State's brief

at 28.

5

a warrants

The State provides no

record

The State is quick to criticize the Bravo court, yet it
relies on a similar case. State v. Kent, 391 So.2d 429 (La. 1981),
addressed a witness discovered through a confession of a juvenile
invalid under a Louisiana decision which holds "that the confession
of a juvenile is absolutely inadmissible unless the prosecution
shows that the juvenile engaged in a meaningful consultation with
an attorney or an informed parent, guardian, or other interested
adult before waiving constitutional rights."
391 So.2d at 431.
The court failed to address whether derivative evidence discovered
under such a non-constitutional dimension violation is suppressible
at all, and proceeded to apply an attenuation analysis.
The State evidently has no problem relying on such cases
where the result, unlike Bravo, supports its position.
12

citations in support of this contention.
24(a)(9)

(requiring

arguments).

citations

to

the

See Utah R. App. P.
record

in

support

of

This contention is not supported by the record, much

less proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
At the initial suppression hearing, Officer Dwyer was
asked what he would have done if he were unaware of the robberies,
but saw defendant's vehicle.
stopped the vehicle.

He responded that

"I would have

Perhaps followed it further and got a more

definite speed and I would have stopped the vehicle, obtained
licenses, run the individuals for wants and warrants, issued a
citation and let them go."

R. 207. At no point did Officer Dwyer

testify concerning radioing in for the registered owner of the
vehicle, and running a wants and warrants check on that registered
owner, without stopping the vehicle.

The theory now advanced by

the State is unsupported by the evidence, and must be rejected.
The State has failed to meet its burden of proving
discovery by a preponderance of the evidence.
467

U.S.

at

444

("If

the

prosecution

inevitable

See Nix v. Williams,
can

establish

by

a

preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or
inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means--here the
volunteers' search--then the deterrence rationale has so little
basis that the evidence should be received.").
The State fares no better if it changes its theory to one
where Officer Dwyer would have pulled appellant over for a future
violation.

At the initial suppression hearing, the trial court

determined that there was no violation allowing Officer Dwyer to
13

pull

Mr.

McGrath

determination.

over.

The

State

failed

to

appeal

that

Any theory premised on pulling Mr. McGrath for a

future violation necessarily is premised on pure speculation.
The
admission

of

"[I]nevitable
focuses

on

inevitable
tainted

discovery

evidence

discovery
demonstrated

doctrine

does

to be premised

involves

no

historical

on

speculative
facts

not

permit

speculation.
elements

capable

of

but
ready

verification or impeachment and does not require a departure from
the usual burden of proof at suppression hearings."
U.S. at 444 n.5.

Williams, 467

Any contention that Mr. McGrath would have

committed a violation permitting Officer Dwyer to pull him over is
speculative, and must be rejected.
The State presents an alternate theory:
Even if no stop had ever occurred, the truck's
license plate number would have led police to defendant,
and thence to his mother, whose statement would have
implicated Ricks. His "numerous warrants" would have
landed Ricks in jail, where police would have questioned
him about the aggravated robberies. Ricks might or might
not have been motivated by the plea bargain in connection
with these robberies, but he would still have been
motivated by some or all of the following:
fear that
defendant would turn state's evidence first, the pendency
of "numerous" unrelated charges, a desire to help
himself, and a desire to change his lifestyle.
State's brief at 29. Once again, the State offers no record cites.
There is no proof of "demonstrated historical facts capable of
ready verification or impeachment" as Williams requires. The State
is relying on pure speculation.
First, there is no evidence that Mrs. McGrath would have
remembered anything of the night in question had it not been for
the fact that she received a call from her son in jail subsequent
14

to the illegal stop.

This event, surely a startling and prominent

event for any parent, fixed the events of that evening in her mind
and are likely the only reason she remembers anything about that
particular evening.
Second, even if Mrs. McGrath remembered Mr. Ricks, and
the police picked him up, this is fundamentally different than
being apprehended with robbery proceeds.

The police would only be

likely to get the usual response of "I don't know 'nuthin'," in
response to interrogation at that point.

The State's speculation

concerning possible motivations to confess to armed robberies is
wholly unsupported by the record.

Mr. Ricks was called as a

witness at the suppression hearing.

R. 139-154.

Certainly, the

State could have asked Mr. Ricks while he was on the stand to
testify concerning whether he feared that appellant would turn
State's evidence, whether other pending charges would have induced
him to confess to other offenses,6 whether he had a desire to help
himself,7 and whether he had a desire to change his lifestyle.8 Any
6

This contention is ludicrous. "Well, they probably have me
on a 1 to 15, so I might as well ' f ess up and get a couple 5 to
lifes with enhancements in addition." This simply does not occur,
and the State has not shown by a preponderance that it would have
occurred here.
Confessing to crimes is not helpful to the confessor.
Confessing to additional crimes does not result overall in a better
plea bargain. Mr. Ricks' case proves the point. Originally faced
with 4 second degree felonies, carrying a maximum term of 15 years,
he pled guilty to a first degree felony carrying a sentence of up
to life imprisonment.
From his perspective, this was hardly
beneficial for him.
8

As an aside, Mr. Ricks' probation revocation on May 19, 1995,
see docket for case No. 931900518 FS, is strongly suggestive of the
(continued...)
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evidence concerning Mr. Ricks' true motivations is entirely lacking
as a direct result of the State's failure to inquire.

The State's

fantasized motivations, raised for the first time on appeal, must
be rejected as speculation.
The single case relied on by the State, State v. Hoffman,
385 F.2d 501, 503 (7th Cir. 1967), is not helpful.

In Hoffman,

prior to the illegal arrests which revealed the true identities of
the suspects, "the existence of these persons, their association
together, and the fact that some stolen money orders had been left
behind in the motel room occupied by one of them, were facts which
became

known

seizure."

apart

from

the

385 F.2d at 503.

arrests

and

unlawful

search

This case is distinguishable.

and

Here,

Mr. Ricks' identity and possible complicity in the armed robberies
was entirely unknown to the police and only discovered as a result
of the unlawful stop of appellant's vehicle.
The State failed to prove

inevitable discovery by a

preponderance of the evidence, and that doctrine thus fails to
provide a basis for the admissibility of Mr. Ricks' testimony.

B,

THE STATE'S INEVITABLE DISCOVERY THEORY
EVISCERATES THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE, AND IS
UNSUPPORTED BY CASE LAW.

Absent any evidence to support its theory, the State's
basic premise is that Officer Dwyer could

8

have checked the vehicle

(...continued)
fact that Mr. Ricks has not changed his lifestyle much, if at all.
Mr. Ricks has been sent to prison. See id.
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registration, found outstanding warrants on the registered owner,
and stopped the vehicle, all of which would have been legal.

Under

the inevitable discovery doctrine, however, the State is obligated
to prove that Officer Dwyer would

have followed a legal course of

action in stopping the vehicle and discovering both the identity of
Mr. Ricks and the robbery proceeds.
disprove any such contention.
first

The very facts of this case

As conclusively determined at the

suppression hearing, Officer Dwyer conducted

an

illegal

traffic stop, not premised on reasonable articulable suspicion.
The facts here prove that Officer Dwyer would conduct an illegal
stop, and would not proceed by legal means.

Under settled Utah

law, "the prosecution must show that the evidence !would' have been
discovered,

not

discovered.
1995)

simply

that

it

'could1

or

'might' have

State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 923 n.8

(citing State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 225, 242

been

(Utah App.

(Or. 1985));

accord United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 842 (1st Cir. 1983)
("[T]he exclusionary rule is not aborted whenever the government
can show that illegally obtained evidence could
obtained.
than

at

. . .
the

have been lawfully

The rule is aimed more at the unlawful conduct

lawful

availability

or

unavailability

of

the

evidence.").
In Williams, the Supreme Court provided only minimal
guidelines on application of the inevitable discovery doctrine.
First, the court held that the burden is on the prosecution to
prove inevitable discovery by a preponderance of the evidence.
U.S. at 444.

467

The sole remaining guidance comes in footnote 5,
17

where

the

court

notes

that

"inevitable

discovery

involves

no

speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts
capable of ready verification or impeachment and does not require
a

departure

hearings."

from

the

usual

burden

of

proof

at

suppression

467 U.S. at 444 n.5.
Courts applying the inevitable discovery doctrine have

developed varying standards for its application.

Some courts have

required that an independent investigation be ongoing at the time
of the police misconduct.

E.g. United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d

1196, 1204 (5th Cir. 1985) (necessary to show "that the police also
prior to the misconduct were actively pursuing the alternate line
of investigation"), United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846
(11th

Cir.

1984)

1984)

("if

evidence

is obtained

by

illegal

conduct, the illegality can be cured only if the police possessed
and were pursuing a lawful means of discovery at the time the
illegality occurred, [cites omitted]

The Government cannot later

initiate a lawful avenue of obtaining the evidence and then claim
that it should be admitted because its discovery was'inevitable.") ,
United

States

("Clearly

v.

these

Owens,
officers

782
were

F.2d

146,

not

152

(10th

conducting

an

Cir.

1986)

independent

investigation that inevitably would have uncovered the cocaine."),
see also United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 704

(10th Cir.

1982) (danger of "admitting unlawfully obtained evidence 'on the
strength of

some

judge's

speculation

that

it would

have

been

discovered legally anyway,' . . . is diminished when, as here, the
evidence clearly would have been discovered within a short time
18

through a lawful

investigation already underway.").

Here the

police were not pursuing a lawful means of discovery at the time of
the illegal traffic stop.
Other

courts

have

declined

to

require

an

ongoing,

independent investigation, but these courts still require a more
rigorous showing than that proposed by the State.

In United States

v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 744 (1st Cir. 1986), the court made a
three part inquiry:
are the legal means truly independent; are both the use
of the legal means and the discovery by that means truly
inevitable; and does the application of the inevitable
discovery exception either provide an incentive for
police misconduct
or significantly weaken
fourth
amendment protection?
Under

this

inquiry,

the

inevitable

inapplicable to the facts at hand.
are not

independent.

discovery

doctrine

is

The State's proposed theories

All involve Officer Dwyer, and rely on

information he obtained just prior to and during the illegal stop.
In terms of inevitability, no testimony was presented concerning
departmental policy concerning

investigating

license plates to

obtain wants and warrants, nor did Officer Dwyer testify concerning
any individual policy he had.

Officer Dwyer did not even testify

that if he thought he had insufficient reasonable suspicion to stop
appellant's vehicle, he would have run a check on the license plate
and attempted to determine if there were any wants or warrants on
the registered owner.

All the State offers is speculation, devoid

of the "demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification
or impeachment" required by Williams.
incentives,

militates

against

The final factor, police

application
19

of

the

inevitable

discovery

doctrine

here.

The

only

way

to

effectively

deter

unlawful traffic stops such as occurred here, is to suppress both
the primary fruits and derivative fruits of those seizures.
People v. Knapp, 422 N.E.2d 531, 536

(N.Y. 1981), is

instructive:
The People do not suggest any other means by which they
would have gained possession of the contraband in
question except for the by now tainted search of the
bedroom and basement. Once so flawed, it could not be
reincarnated as a hypothetical untainted one. Were the
rule otherwise, every warrantless nonexigent seizure
automatically would be legitimatized by assuming the
hypothetical alternative that a warrant had been
obtained.
Without the deterr[]ent effect of the
exclusionary
rule,
in
such
circumstances
the
constitutional warrant procedure shielding Americans from
unreasonable searches and seizures would be a shambles.
We are not here now to address whether Officer Dwyer could

have

conducted himself lawfully and obtained sufficient information to
warrant a stop of appellant's vehicle.
not.

The

State has not proved

The simple truth is he did

that Mr. Ricks' identity

and

complicity in the robberies would have inevitably been discovered.
As a result, derivative evidence, including the testimony of Mr.
Ricks, must be suppressed.
People v. Turriacrof

644 N.Y.S.2d

178

(N.Y. App. Div.

1996), like the present case, involved a post hoc rationalization
for

how

the police

could

constitutional fashion.
speeding.

have proceeded

(but did

not)

in a

In Turriacro, a vehicle was stopped for

Prior to verifying the veracity of the driver's license

or registration, the trooper asked for consent to search based on
mere curiosity and the fact that it was the first day of hunting

20

season.

Consent to search was granted and revealed a homicide

victim.

The court held that the request

premised

on reasonable

articulable

for consent was not

suspicion.

Addressing

the

prosecution's inevitable discovery argument, the court stated:
Finally, there is no merit to the People's
bootstrap argument that, irrespective of the lack of
legal predicate for the search of the vehicle, the body
of Fernando Cuervo would inevitably have been discovered
[ ] . It is the People's contention that the police were
bound to learn, as ultimately they did, that none of the
three men had a valid operator's permit to drive the van.
Therefore, they assert, the vehicle was required to have
been impounded [ ] and would have been subject to an
inventory search. Overlooking, for the time being, the
infirmity of this reasoning, it must be emphasized that,
while the State Troopers properly obtained the vehicle
registration and the operator's license [ ] , the record
indicates that they made no attempt to verify the
documentation before proceeding to seek defendant's
permission to search it [ ] . This sequence of events
only lends further support to the conclusion that the
search "was the product of an inseparable illegal
detention" [ ] .
In any event, the law on this subject is
settled. "The doctrine of inevitable discovery may not
be used to excuse unlawful police actions by admitting
what was obtained as a direct result of the misconduct"
[ ] .
. . .
We hold that applying the inevitable
discovery rule in these circumstances, and effecting what
would amount to a post hoc rationalization of the initial
wrong [ ] , would be an unacceptable dilution of the
exclusionary rule."
Turriacro,
inevitable

644

N.Y.S.2d

discovery

rationalizations

at

rule

183.
is

identical

inapplicable

are too easily

necessary deterrent

For

concocted,

reasons,

the

Post

hoc

and obliterate

the

here.

function of the exclusionary rule.

It is

always possible for the police to act within constitutional bounds.
Their failure to do so necessitates that the exclusionary rule be
given full effect.

21

The State cites no cases where, under facts similar to
those here, a court has held the inevitable discovery rule to be
applicable.

Application of the rule here would severely undermine

the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule and is not warranted.

POINT V. APPELLANT'S STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT
CONCERNING THE PROPER ATTENUATION STANDARD IS
PRESERVED FOR REVIEW.
(Responding to State's brief at Point Three, pp.
30-31)
The State asserts that appellant's claim that Utah should
apply the same attenuation analysis for live witness testimony as
for physical evidence is not preserved.

This is not so.

In the

trial court, counsel for Mr. McGrath cited State v. Arroyo. 796
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), for the test that should apply in this case,
to live witness testimony.

R. 168-72.

Arroyo neither sets forth

a more stringent test for suppression of live witness testimony,
nor cites any case that sets forth a more stringent test.

The

State neither cited Ceccolini or any other case setting forth a
more stringent test, nor argued that a more stringent test should
apply.

Defense counsel plainly argued that in this case, involving

live witness testimony, the normal attenuation test should apply.
This, coupled with her invocation of article I, section 14, R. 163,
preserves this issue for review:
[I]n order to preserve a plea of error, the alleged error
must have been raised seasonably by counsel to the trial
court. The purpose of this rule is to allow the trial
court to correct any error, if error there be.

22

Utah

County v. Brown,

omitted).
1989);

672 P.2d

83, 85

(Utah 1983)

(footnote

See also Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App.

Bundy v. Century Equip. Co. , 692 P.2D 754, 758 (Utah 1984);

Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667,
672 (Utah 1982);

James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App.

1987).
The only

argument presented to the trial court was that

the normal, rather than a more restrictive, attenuation test should
apply.

Ceccolini and its progeny were not raised by either party.

The trial court necessarily considered Mr. McGrath's claims under
that test.

This issue is preserved.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing and Mr. McGrath's opening brief,
it is respectfully requested that this court reverse the denial of
Mr.

McGrath's

suppression

motion,

and

remand

the

case

for

withdrawal of his plea and further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/b

day of August, 1996.

X^#—ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

LISA J. REMAL
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A
Waiver form, preliminary hearing testimony, and Glover's
police report.

SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
YOUR RIGHTS

PLACEDATE.
TIME

3-QO-qz
1^:6^

Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights.
Your have the right to remain silent.
Anything you say can be used against you in court.
You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to
have him with you during questioning.
If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning
if you wish.
If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you will still have the
right toxtop answering at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time
until you talk to a lawyer.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS
I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing
to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made TO me and no
pressure or coercion of any kind has been used aaainst me.
Signed.
oiane

•4 Y°^M

WITNESS.
WITNESS.
TIME

^Jo? to . Odtz: sfyd so
SO. U 9

Urjcto

PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT
November 18, 1993
STATE OF UTAH V. DALE MC GRATH
CASE NUMBER: 931013303FS
CHARGE: AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 1°
DEFENSE: LISA J. REMAL
PROSECUTOR: JIM COPE
JUDGE: DENNIS M. FUCHS
TAPE NUMBERS: T2428 & T2429
EXCLUSIONARY RULE INVOKED
SWEARING IN OF WITNESSES
FORMAL READING OF THE INFORMATION WAIVED
Begin Tape T2428, beginning of Side B.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
COPE:

Would you give us your full name?

A:

Richard Colin Andrus, A N D R U S.

Q:

Mr. Andrus, we want to talk about

some

things

that

happened on the 22nd day of March, 1993, very early in the morning.
Could you tell the Court where you were during the very early
morning hours of the 22nd of March, 1993?
A:

I

was

employed

by

Maverick

Country

Stores

at

approximately 5400 South 5600 West.
Q:

And you were working during that period of time between

say 12:00 and 2:00 in the morning?
A:

I was working then.

Q:

Did anything unusual happen to you at that time?

A:

Yes.

I was confronted by a, a, armed man who demanded

that I go in the store and give him the money from the till.
Q:

With what was the man armed?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And that he was arrested, a, at the time that the white

truck Mr. McGrath was driving was stopped.
A:

That's true, that's true.

Q:

And in fact Mr. McGrath and Mr. Ricks were arrested at

the same time.

A

That's true.

Q

And, a, ultimately booked into the jail on ???

A

That's correct.

Q

For these offenses?

A

That's correct.

Q

A, did you speak to Mr., a. Mr. Ricks there at the scene

of his arrest or sometime later at the jail?
A:

Later.

Q:

All right.

A:

At the jail.

Q:

Within a few days of his arrest?

A:

The next morning I believe.

Q:

And I, a, presume you made a police report reflecting the

contents or the summary of your conversation with Mr. Ricks, is
that right?
A:

I did.

Q:

And that was one of the pieces of information that you

presented to Mr. Cope when you screened the case back in March last
year.
A:

The original case, yes.
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